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Privatization of large state-owned enterprises has been one of the most radical new 
policies of the last quarter century. While many countries had engaged in large 
nationalization programs during the decades following World War II, Margaret Thatcher 
initiated a policy swing in the other direction in the 1980s by pushing for aggressive 
privatization of many of the large state-owned British firms. In the following two 
decades, privatization policies were implemented throughout the planet, as both left and 
right leaning governments alike undertook a policy of privatization. Right wing 
governments engaged in privatization in an effort to keep down the size of government, 
while Left wing governments implemented privatization policies in order to generate 
revenues, and also because they were persuaded of the virtues of markets and competition 
after being disappointed with the inefficiencies of large state-owned firms. In this way, 
privatization spread from Europe to Latin America, Asia and Africa, reaching a high 
point with the transition from socialism to capitalism following the fall of the Berlin wall. 
Transition economies were then faced with the task of privatizing their whole economies. 
In theses cases, quite diverse policies were put in place, ranging from a gradual sale of 
state property to foreign and domestic investors (as was the case in Hungary and Poland) 
to more radical  programs called “mass privatization programs” which resulted in the 
rapid giveaway of state owned assets.  
 Privatization policies generated huge controversies. In many countries, they were 
criticized for their regressive redistribution effects. State ownership in many countries 
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was used as a tool of redistribution that made it possible to provide cheap water, energy 
or transport for poorer segments of the population. Privatization has thus been associated 
with cutbacks in redistribution and has stirred popular discontent in many countries. 
Privatization programs were also systematically criticized for the rents they generated 
among the acquirers of state assets. Mass privatization in Russia, for example, fell under 
attack for fabulously enriching in a very short period a small group of very powerful 
oligarchs. Accusations of corruption and cronyism have stained the reputation of 
privatization programs in many countries. More blandly, the efficiency improvements 
expected from privatization have often been hard to detect or altogether absent. 
 . In the spirit of the mission of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, this volume, 
developed by the IPD Privatization Task Force, brings together some of the world’s 
foremost experts on the subject. In the following essays, the contributors present their 
knowledge about privatization, not just for an academic world, but also for a far wider 
audience.  It would be presumptuous to assert that every single topic is covered, but the 
reader will find in this volume a comprehensive overview of the issues associated with 
privatization, as well as a coverage of specific privatization projects undertaken in 
different continents.  
 One of the main reasons that privatization programs were first pushed forward is 
the disappointment with the economic performance of state-owned enterprises. It might 
appear to the outside observer uncontroversial that the proposition that private ownership 
is economically more efficient than state ownership. Yet this has not been the case in 
economic theory. In this volume, Gérard Roland reviews the economic literature on 
private and public ownership. Citing in particular general equilibrium theory—one of the 
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central components of economic theory—Roland explains how ownership of firms plays 
no role at all, provided the latter act in a manner that maximizes their profits. What 
matters most is that firms face a perfectly competitive environment. In traditional 
industrial organization theory, there is a priori not much difference between a natural 
monopoly under government ownership or under private ownership with government 
regulation. It has really only been in the last decades—with the advent of contract 
theory—that one has been able to pin down differences between private and public 
ownership in the context of imperfect competition. One branch of contract theory, 
complete contract theory, emphasizes the differences in information under public and 
private ownership and how they affect the incentives of the firms. Incomplete contract 
theory attaches great importance to ownership as residual rights of control in situations 
not provided for by the contract. The picture that emerges is that private ownership gives 
better incentives to invest, to innovate, to reduce costs and to reduce inefficient 
government intervention in firms. On the other hand, this higher efficiency may come at 
the cost of quality and other socially valuable objectives and may even increase 
corruption within government. The analysis of the tradeoffs between public and private 
ownership have become more sophisticated. Interestingly, many of the tradeoffs pointed 
to by these theories can now be observed in the actual experience of privatization. 
 Western Europe is the world leader in privatization revenues with roughly a third 
of privatization proceeds over the period 1977-2002.  Bernardo Bortolotti and Valentina 
Milella remind us that Western Europe also implemented extensive nationalization 
programs after World War II.  Later, when the UK initiated a large privatization program 
under Margaret Thatcher, continental Europe also experienced large programs of 
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divestiture of state assets. High privatization revenues are associated, not surprisingly, 
with high per capita GDP and large and liquid stock markets, but they are also associated 
with a higher public debt and lower growth. The latter findings suggest that concerns for 
fiscal imbalances and deterioration of economic performances might have played an 
important role in triggering privatization programs. Privatization efforts were greater in 
countries with a majoritarian electoral rule. Interestingly, all else being equal, left wing 
governments do not appear to have privatized less than right wing governments. 
Surprisingly, there is scant evidence as to the macroeconomic effects of privatization in 
Western Europe. The only solid evidence found is the negative impact of privatization on 
public debt, not an unexpected result. Privatization is associated with a vigorous financial 
market development. It is also associated with better performance at the level of 
individual firms. However, the empirical evidence is often not convincing because it 
compares the performance of firms that were privatized with others that were not. The 
performance effect might reflect the fact that those enterprises that were privatized were 
either the most profitable or had the highest potential for profitability. There are as yet 
too few studies measuring correctly the causal effect of privatization on enterprise 
performance. An especially interesting finding reported by Bortolotti and Milella is that a 
large part of privatization deals (at least 30%) led to the divestiture of only a minority of 
shares of state-owned firms. Yet, governments have kept sizable residual stakes in 
privatized firms and appear reluctant to lose their control over state assets. These 
interesting findings are quite recent and will undoubtedly be investigated in future 
research.  
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 The most spectacular privatization experience is undoubtedly the one that took 
place in the transition process from socialism to capitalism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Jan Hanousek, Evzen Kocenda and Jan Svejnar review this historical 
phenomenon. They insist that privatization policies must be seen within the general 
context of the transition strategy adopted in each country, including the relative role 
given to privatization of large state-owned firms and to the development of a new private 
sector. Economists were deeply divided between those who on the one hand advocated a 
very rapid privatization relying on giveaway schemes—the so-called mass privatization 
programs, and those who, on the other hand, advocated a more cautious approach based 
on the gradual sale of state assets. The literature abounds with various schemes on how to 
implement one of these two approaches. Countries like Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and 
Hungary adopted the gradualist approach. Russia, the Ukraine, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania and, to a certain extent, Slovakia adopted forms of mass privatization 
programs. Within that general classification, the details of the programs varied from 
country to country. The few studies on the determinants of privatization suggest that the 
more profitable firms were privatized first, which is consistent with political economic 
theories of privatization where the sequencing of privatization is used to gather support 
for further privatization. But there is astonishing diversity in the results of the studies on 
the effects of privatization firm performance. Many studies were made very shortly after 
privatization first occurred. Other studies relied on rather rough measures of ownership 
noting only a public-private distinction and could not measure differences in ownership 
structure and corporate governance. Many studies suffer from a selection bias already 
alluded to. If the more profitable firms were privatized first, superior performance in 
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those firms cannot be causally attributed to privatization. The studies that correct for this 
bias generally find more modest effects of privatization. The strongest effects seem to be 
reached in cases of where state assets where sold to foreign owners. Employee and 
manager ownership rarely has a significant positive effect on firm performance—be it 
total factor productivity, labor productivity or profitability. The survey by Hanousek, 
Kocenda and Svejnar is quite thorough in terms of the performance variables analyzed.  
 John Nellis gives a careful overview of privatization policies and their effects in 
Africa. African governments have as a rule not wholeheartedly embraced privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. Only a minority of state-owned enterprises have been subject to 
privatization in most African countries. Very little privatization has taken place outside of 
the following five countries: South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Cote d’Ivoire. 
Infrastructure is the sector where one finds the largest state-owned enterprises in Africa 
but privatization in that sector has lagged behind. When privatization does take place, the 
government usually keeps a significant ownership share. In Africa there is much less 
evidence regarding the effects of privatization, than in Europe, and the evidence, scarce 
as it is, is at best mixed. Privatization in Cote d’Ivoire seems to have had positive effects 
on firm performance. A similar picture emerges from Ghana. However there are many 
caveats. Positive effects seem to be observed only when privatization is associated with 
enhanced competition and a better quality of regulation. There is also evidence of rent-
seeking, regulatory capture, reduction in affordability of public services, and a loss of 
jobs—all of which further feeds resentment within the country and increases the 
reluctance of African governments to go further along the route of privatization. Nellis 
argues that even when negative effects are observed, it is not obvious that the 
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counterfactual—namely the absence of privatization—would have delivered better 
results. This is due in part to the general deterioration of public services and of the 
economy in general in many countries. The poor performance of privatization has in the 
Eastern European context often been attributed to weakness in institutions. This is likely 
to be even truer in Africa. However, it is not realistic to expect large institutional changes 
in Africa in the medium run. Nellis explores possible solutions to this problem such as 
the outsourcing of institutional provision, and the use of offshore commercial arbitration 
mechanisms or of NGOs to vet transactions. However, few of these solutions are likely to 
find much political support. It appears that the return of Africa to a path of growth and 
development cannot, in the near future at least, rely too much on privatization.  
 Chile was one of the first countries to start a large-scale privatization program. 
Chile began privatizing in 1974 after the Pinochet coup—many years before Thatcher 
started privatizing in the UK. In the later eighties and early nineties, many other Latin 
American countries also engaged in extensive privatization. Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, 
Argentina and El Salvador, for example, all launched quite ambitious privatization 
programs. Antonio Estache and Lourdes Trujillo details Latin America’s diverse 
experience with privatization and gives a country-by-country account of its privatization 
policies.  Privatization of infrastructure plays a special role in Latin America, pointing to 
politically delicate distributive issues such as access to water, electricity and public 
transport. Indeed, it was only under extreme fiscal strain that large infrastructure 
privatization programs were launched. Because of fears of political backlash, assets were 
generally leased instead of sold and concession contracts were widely used. Nonetheless, 
this has not prevented some forms of political backlash when, on several occasions, 
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electricity or water shortages emerged. What has privatization achieved in Latin 
America? It seems to have been an effective tool to generate revenues. Moreover, overall 
we have seen a strong flow of investment in the privatized firms. Privatized firms have in 
general improved their profitability and productivity. Gains are mostly present in 
regulated sectors, rather than in firms in competitive sectors. Estache and Trujillo also 
reminds us that privatization often had quite a positive impact on the quality of goods and 
services in the privatized firms.  In these cases, improvements were initially welcomed by 
the population and generated support for privatization. So, why has political support for 
privatization disappeared in recent years? One reason is that privatization has rarely put 
an end to subsidies or to government investment in the sectors concerned. While 
privatization has generated a stock of revenues, it has often not reduced the flow of 
government expenditures in the privatized sectors. Another reason why support for 
privatization has subsided relates to the redistribution of gains. Privatization has 
generated large rents for new owners but these have not been shared with the general 
public. There are cases such as the Cochabamba water concession in Bolivia where the 
poorer segments of the population faced price increases for water. This is due to 
regulatory failure resulting, most often, from regulatory capture. Despite the organization 
of competitive bids, in practice, there has been very little competition between bidders. 
The reason for this is not clear but might be due in part to collusion between private 
firms.  It might also be a result of extreme international concentration in some markets. 
Related to the weakness of competition is the fact that many privatization deals were 
renegotiated only a few years after the initial privatization took place. This often led to 
higher prices and more rents for the private owners. Restructuring in privatized firms has 
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led to job losses that were quite salient. For example, in the international sanitation 
business (water, sanitation and solid waste), the same five large companies have been 
involved in all privatization deals the world over.  
 Despite its strong economic dynamism, the Asian continent has not been at the 
forefront of the world’s privatization efforts. This is especially the case for South Asia 
(Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). Nandini Gupta analyzes the experience of 
privatization in these countries. India, after its independence, developed a sizable public 
sector and adopted some form of central planning. But after the collapse of central 
planning in the former socialist economies, India’s reforms efforts also gained strength. 
However, privatization achievements remained modest. Until very recently, most 
privatization was partial and consisted of the divestiture of minority shares in public 
enterprises.  Nevertheless, Gupta gives extensive evidence that partial privatization has 
had positive effects. The floating of shares on the stock market has allowed for 
improvement in the monitoring of management. Privatization has also had a positive 
effect on the development of stock markets. Yet, limited capacities of financial markets 
as well as limited administrative capabilities and political obstacles have constrained the 
speed of privatization. An important reason for the reluctance of politicians to privatize is 
that state-owned enterprises are used for political patronage. Privatization therefore tends 
to be slower in provinces where there is sharp political competition. 
 
Finally, the subject of privatization has been very controversial. The last chapter of this 
volume summarizes the perspective of one of privatization’s most vocal critics,  Jomo 
K.S.  He puts the current debate in historical context, and cites the literature providing 
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evidence of how privatization may not have had as positive effects on efficiency as its 
advocates claim, even aside from its adverse equity implications.  He also shows that due 
to these revealed deficiencies, the debate over privatization has evolved over time.  
 
 Overall, some common themes emerge from the various contributions to this 
volume. First of all, partial privatization tends to be more widespread than one might 
think. Governments in Western Europe, India and elsewhere are reluctant to relinquish 
control (partly or fully) over state-owned enterprises. This is not surprising but is still an 
important fact that has emerged from the privatization experience of the last decades. 
Whether partial privatization has beneficial effects or not depends on many factors and 
one should be wary of making sweeping generalizations. Partial privatization may 
enhance the monitoring of enterprises but it may also keep alive inefficient forms of 
government intervention. The efficiency effects of privatization are generally mixed but 
rarely negative. This is true even though many empirical studies tend to overestimate the 
efficiency effects due to sample selection bias that has plagued many econometric 
estimation of privatization. While privatization appears uncontroversial in competitive 
sectors (even though its effects may be small in relation to the incentive effects of 
competition), it becomes increasingly complex in more monopolistic sectors where good 
regulation is a necessary and crucial complement to privatization. However, creating 
good regulation is easier said than done. There is a real danger (documented in particular 
in the chapters on Africa and Latin America) that privatization will lead to a form of 
regulatory capture that generates large rents for the new private owners while creating 
welfare losses for consumers. This can especially harm the poorest segments of the 
population that may be hurt strongly by the regressive redistributive effects often 
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generated by privatization. Calling for better regulation might be illusory because it 
would require a major institutional overhaul that is not in the cards in the immediate 
future. Thus, policymakers involved with privatization often face a large dilemma: be 
cautious with privatization and face the continued inefficiencies of state-owned 
enterprises with the prospect of further deteriorations or be bold and risk major political 
backlash because of the redistributive effects of privatization, especially if rent-seeking 
and regulatory capture are involved. This is a steep trade-off. However, in the larger 
context of development, focusing on the restructuring of large state-owned enterprises, by 
privatization and the complementary policies, might prove to be misguided. Statist 
policies of development have focused on the creation of large state-owned enterprises in 
the hope that this would lead developing economies to close the gap between themselves 
and the developed economies. Liberalization policies based on the Washington 
Consensus have also focused on these large enterprises hoping that the transfer of 
ownership to the private sector would foster accelerated growth in the economy. The 
privatization policies of particular countries might however at best have had second-order 
effects on growth. Countries that have experienced impressive growth in recent years 
such as China, India and Vietnam have not had an impressive privatization policy. 
Rather, they have been able to unleash the productive energies of millions of small 
entrepreneurs, creating a vibrant and thriving sector of small and medium enterprises 
which serve both the domestic and the export market. One would hope that international 
financial organizations pay as much attention to the development of the small private 
sector as they have to privatization policies in the past. 
 
  
